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FEATURE COMMENT • Watching The
Sunset: Anticipating GAO’s Study Of
Concurrent Bid Protest Jurisdiction In
The COFC And The District Courts
The 1970 ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in Scanwell Labs.,
Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
12 GC ¶ 64—finding a forum in the federal District Courts for award-related challenges to federal procurement decisions—and congressional
tinkering with bid protest jurisdiction at the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims (COFC) and its predecessor (the Claims Court), have turned the issue
of bid protest jurisdiction into a legal experiment.
That experiment essentially has allowed bid protest litigation to proceed in two different and independent judicial fora for the last 30 years. The
pending sunset of statutory District Court jurisdiction over bid protest actions—pursuant to the
terms of the Administrative Dispute Resolution
Act of 1996—has created an opportunity to judge
the success or failure of this experiment. To assist in its determination of whether to preserve
concurrent judicial jurisdiction over bid protests,
Congress directed the General Accounting Office
(GAO) to undertake a comprehensive study of the
need for concurrent bid protest jurisdiction.
In anticipation of GAO’s report (expected to
be released later this spring), this FEATURE COMMENT introduces the history leading up the ADRA’s
provisions regarding (1) District Court jurisdiction to resolve protest matters and (2) GAO’s
mandate to study the impact of these provisions
upon small businesses. The COMMENT discusses how
the current protest regime helps ensure procurement integrity. The COMMENT then critiques the
1-701-108-1
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scope and methodology of the soon-to-be-completed GAO study. In doing so, the COMMENT highlights a number of significant issues expected to
remain unaddressed at the conclusion of GAO’s
endeavors. The COMMENT then turns to the study’s
gravamen, arguing that GAO must conclude that
the elimination of District Court jurisdiction would
hinder the opportunity of small businesses to challenge violations of federal procurement law.
Setting the Stage—This 30-year tale begins
with a (somewhat delayed) judicial reaction to the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 USC § 701
et seq. (1946). That reaction came in the form of
the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Scanwell, wherein
the Court opted to exercise jurisdiction under the
APA over suits brought by disappointed offerors,
likening those contractors that initiate bid protests
to private attorneys general (AGs). The Court suggested that protesters—intent upon ensuring agencies’ adherence to procurement statutes and regulations—help keep the Government honest while
pursuing their own business interests.
Scanwell triggered sporadic development of judicial disappointed offeror litigation to coexist with
the more popular administrative forum at GAO
(i.e., the Comptroller General’s office, part of the
legislative branch). Arguably, the Government has
since relied heavily upon these private AGs to justify its minimal oversight of the contract award
process. In theory, these prospective contractors,
who depend on a fair procurement process to obtain new business, effectively deter and ferret out
errors and improprieties in the process.
Twelve years after Scanwell, in the Federal
Courts Improvement Act (FCIA) of 1982, P.L.
97-164, 96 Stat. 25, Congress granted the Claims
Court a statutory share of bid protest litigation. In
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the FCIA, Congress assigned the Claims Court “exclusive” jurisdiction over protest actions preceding the award of a Federal Government contract.
In the wake of the FCIA, the nation’s federal Appellate Courts split over the issue of whether the
District Courts properly could exercise preaward
and postaward jurisdiction over bid protest matters. Confusion reigned and Congress watched, yet
provided no answer. In the protest community, however, these developments were overshadowed by
Congress’s decision to grant to the General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals
(GSBCA) jurisdiction over protests concerning the
award of contracts for automatic data processing
equipment (ADPE) and information technology (IT).
This forum was tremendously popular, yet lasted
only from 1985–1994.
The late 1990s saw GAO expand its quasi-judicial protest services and Congress’ repeal of its
grant of bid protest jurisdiction to the GSBCA.
Moreover, the procurement reform wave that
characterized the end of the decade also led to
changes in bid protest litigation. Confusion still
existed as to which forum—the COFC or the District Courts—was the “exclusive” arbiter of
preaward and postaward bid protests; Congress
temporarily resolved that confusion by enacting
the ADRA, P.L. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870 (1996). In
the ADRA, Congress expressly granted the District Courts and the COFC concurrent preaward
and postaward jurisdiction, to expire on December 31, 2000, unless Congress acted to extend District Court jurisdiction. At the same time, Congress tasked GAO to study the need for
concurrent jurisdiction and to report on this issue by the end of 1999.
Concurrent Jurisdiction Helps Preserve
Procurement Integrity—Taking a step back, it
is apparent even to the casual observer that elimination of District Court protest jurisdiction would
reduce the volume of disappointed offeror litigation. The extent of that reduction, however, is difficult to predict. Moreover, given what currently
is known about GAO’s study, GAO will not be able
to predict either how much the “sunset” will decrease bid protest filings or how this reduction will
affect the procurement process as a whole. The
obvious effects are a likely increase in the COFC’s
caseload and further disruption to its processes, a
tiny boost to the D.C.-area economy from increased

law firm billings and additional witness travel, and
the consolidation of Justice Department expertise
and litigation burdens in a single forum. The end
of statutory District Court protest jurisdiction thus
would please certain policy makers, procurement
executives, Contracting Officers, some D.C.-area
private practitioners, and a number of Government
attorneys. But this view is short-sighted.
The Scanwell Court, viewing disappointed
offerors as a motivated and self-interested corps
of private AGs, thought that a robust protest regime would serve the Government and the public
by providing a valuable oversight function. Unfortunately, the previous decade’s procurement
reforms have complicated exercise of that private
AG function and, indeed, have reduced oversight
opportunities on various levels.
Head in the Sand Oversight: Stripping away
the layers of rhetoric touting the efficiencies to
be gained from the reform of Federal Government
procurement, one finds that the Government has
adopted an ostrich-like approach to procurement
oversight. In the last decade, caught up in a spirit
of eliminating red tape that borders on irrational
exuberance, numerous policies have hampered the
application of existing controls upon the procurement system. While each reform initiative or event
has merits, and most serve important purposes,
the cumulative effect is a weakened oversight
function. Consider the following:
(1) The confluence of micro-purchase authority
and purchase cards has rendered tens of millions
of smaller transactions (which soon will account
for 10% of the procurement budget) immune from
competition requirements and meaningful procurement oversight.
(2) The rapid growth of multiple-award task and
delivery order contracts permits billions of dollars in IT to be procured without meaningful competition at the task order level; moreover, these
procurements are not subject to protest.
(3) More than 10 million purchases each year
above $2,500 but below the simplified acquisition
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threshold of $100,000 can be awarded based upon
three phone calls. (More than 95% of federal procurement actions in Fiscal Year 1998 were below
$25,000.) Absent the standard Commerce Business
Daily notice of these procurement actions, contractors have no knowledge when they are denied
an opportunity to compete and, accordingly, lack
meaningful protest rights.
(4) The volume of protest activity at GAO has
plummeted during the last seven years; while
GAO received some 3,300 protests in 1993, it expects to see fewer than 1,500 this year.
(5) The GSBCA’s authority to adjudicate IT protests was eliminated.
(6) Congress has aggressively downsized the acquisition and support workforce, particularly
within the Department of Defense, which reports
a 55% reduction in acquisition personnel from FY
1989 to FY 2001.

Against this backdrop of reduced oversight,
GAO’s study takes on added significance.
The Study, Missing the Mark?—The statutory deadline for submission of the GAO report
passed quietly, lost, no doubt, in the furor surrounding the successful defeat of the Y2K bug.
Congress envisioned a one-year study, commencing “[n]o earlier than 2 years after the effective
date of this section [Dec. 31, 1996]” (on or around
January 1999) and concluding “no later than December 31, 1999.” Although GAO originally anticipated issuing a draft for comment in January, this
draft now appears slated for mid-March release.
Agencies then will have 30 days to respond, after
which GAO will analyze comments and, where appropriate, incorporate them into the final report,
slated for issuance in late spring.
Unfortunately, it is becoming clear that GAO
has not tackled the broader questions implicated
by Congress’ mandate and may not be able to reconcile its study methodology with Congress’ explicit directions. Section 12(c) of the ADRA required GAO to “undertake a study regarding the
concurrent jurisdiction” of the District Courts and
the COFC as to bid protest litigation “to determine whether concurrent jurisdiction is necessary”
(emphasis added). Aside from that general charge,
the only specific direction Congress gave was that
GAO “shall specifically consider the effect of any
proposed change on the ability of small businesses
to challenge violations of Federal procurement

¶ 108

law.” But despite this direction, its now appears
that the GAO study has not polled the proper participants to enable it to render an opinion about
the potential effects of sunset on small businesses.
For this and other reasons, GAO is in no position
to address the fundamental question of whether
the retention of District Court jurisdiction is “necessary.” In this respect, and others mentioned
below, the study methodology appears flawed.
Flawed Methodology: GAO got a late start on
the study, which was further complicated by its
decision to staff the effort with personnel largely
unfamiliar with the nuances of Government contracting. Apparently, concerns about possible conflicts of interest led GAO to exclude its most
knowledgeable personnel (the General Counsel’s
office attorneys who adjudicate bid protests filed
before the Comptroller General). GAO reasoned
that, to the extent that District Courts “compete”
with the Comptroller General for bid protest “business,” it would be inappropriate for GAO bid protest attorneys to comment on the need for another bid protest forum. Moreover, despite GAO’s
initial efforts to meet with, and solicit input from,
the organized bar and certain affected government
agencies, GAO eventually abandoned its openended approach. GAO’s failure to enlist the aid of
the most knowledgeable public and private sector
individuals raises serious questions regarding the
credibility of its study results.
Based upon its quasi-public meetings and
statements, it is clear that GAO’s methodology
has shifted over the last few months, apparently
at the behest of the staffs of the Senate Governmental Affairs and Armed Services Committees.
More than six months into the study period, the
primary focus of the GAO study dramatically
changed from a broad investigation of issues relevant to judicial bid protest litigation to a more
limited examination of the specific characteristics of the relatively small number of bid protest
cases filed since the ADRA. See 41 GC ¶ 352. As a
result, the sources from whom GAO sought input
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were limited to Government attorneys and private practitioners involved in litigation of postADRA bid protest actions. GAO thus will likely
fail to answer the two most significant questions
implied in the congressional mandate: First, what
happens if Congress does nothing? Second, what
should Congress do?
Other Key Issues Ignored: Moreover, the GAO
study ignored a host of larger legal, policy, and
practical issues. Some of these issues have been
identified and discussed by other Government contracts professionals. For example, the American
Bar Association’s submission to GAO (available at
http://www.abanet.org/contract/federal/bidpro/
scanwell.pdf) identified several common-sense issues that GAO should consider, including (a) the
success to date of concurrent jurisdiction, (b) the
benefits or detriments that derive from concurrent jurisdiction, and (c) the benefits or detriments
that would flow from eliminating District Court
jurisdiction. Both the ABA and the Federal Bar
Association attempted to enlighten the GAO on
these larger issues. (The FBA paper is available
at http://www.contracts.ogc.doc.gov/cld/papers/
fbasunset.pdf.)
In its submission, the ABA implored Congress
to “ensure” that the District Courts are not divested of their jurisdiction in bid protest cases.
The FBA’s report was more tentative (likely due
to its working group’s more balanced private-government mix) and offered three basic conclusions:
(1) District Court jurisdiction “may be desirable
for a number of reasons,” (2) “no clearly significant benefits” would derive from eliminating District Court jurisdiction, and (3) “none of the factors examined is so grave as to compel the
conclusion that [District Court] jurisdiction is absolutely necessary” (emphasis added).
What the GAO Study Won’t Discuss—It
appears that GAO’s study methodology will lack
straightforward recommendations on the basic issue of whether to continue concurrent judicial jurisdiction over bid protests. Nor will the forthcoming report adequately address how the sunset of
the ADRA grant of jurisdiction to District Courts
will affect small businesses. Moreover, the study
may fail to even discuss at least four other significant issues: (a) the advantages and disadvantages
of a single, specialized judicial forum; (b) the likelihood that poor legislative drafting of the ADRA’s

sunset provision will prompt litigation, confusion,
and uncertainty; (c) the potential for forum shopping and precedent fragmentation; and (d) the appropriate allocation of judicial resources.
A Single, Specialized Forum: The COFC, a specialized court, arguably offers greater expertise (as
compared to District Courts) in resolving protest
matters. COFC Chief Judge Loren Smith consistently disputes the premise that the COFC is a
specialized forum, arguing that the court is “neither specialized nor general.” (Alan E. Peterson
Lecture: The Role of the Courts—What Would
Sherlock Holmes Say?, 34 PROC. LAW. 1, 28 (Winter 1999)). Yet even if we labeled the COFC a hybrid specialized court (see, e.g., Richard Revesz,
Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990)),
for the purposes of concurrent jurisdiction, there
is little choice but to regard the COFC as a “specialized” court in comparison to the District Courts,
which exercise more general jurisdiction.
Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss has suggested a
three-factor analysis to determine whether specialized adjudication has been successful: (1) the
quality of decisionmaking, (2) efficiency, and
(3) the appearance of due process. See Forums
of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in
Resolving Business Disputes 61 BROOK. L. REV.
1 (1995). Professor Jeffrey Stempel, meanwhile,
articulates five advantages to specialized jurisdiction: (a) improved precision and predictability of adjudication; (b) more accurate adjudication; (c) more coherent articulation of legal
standards; (d) greater expertise of the bench; and
(e) economies of scale that flow from division of
labor, particularly including speed, reduced costs,
and greater efficiency through streamlining of
repetitive tasks and wasted motions. See Two
Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK . L. REV. 67
(1995). These and other relevant factors should
inform GAO’s deliberations.
While few doubt that the COFC is more familiar with federal procurement statutes, regulations,
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and policies, the District Courts have far greater
expertise in resolving matters brought pursuant
to the APA, just as they are more familiar with
motions seeking injunctive relief. This issue bears
examination; while most COFC judges refer to the
correct APA standard of review (mandated by the
ADRA) in protest cases, as a practical matter, they
manage these cases based upon years of instincts
(such as inclinations to grant discovery) honed in
de novo contract dispute proceedings.
Moreover, limiting the debate to choosing between two judicial fora—one general, one specialized—obscures a significant point. With the Comptroller General’s office, protestors already have
access to a D.C.-based specialized forum. How
valuable is it to then maintain two specialized
fora—albeit one administrative and one judicial?
If only two fora will remain, it seems that the
broadest number of interests are served by maintaining a specialized administrative forum (GAO)
and a judicial forum of general jurisdiction located
in every state.
In terms of a specialized forum, therefore, the
Comptroller General could, with some statutory
and/or regulatory modifications to its jurisdiction,
satisfy most of the goals that motivated Congress
to grant to the COFC “exclusive” jurisdiction over
preaward bid protests in the FCIA. The Comptroller General’s office provides disappointed
offerors extensive Government contracts expertise, uniform precedent, timely decision-making,
the convenience of the automatic stay under the
Competition in Contracting Act, and relatively
reasonable protest costs. Of these benefits, the
latter three are of particular utility to small businesses, the group that Congress specifically directed GAO to consider. As the oldest administrative protest forum, with relatively clear
procedural guidance, the Comptroller General’s
authority conceivably could be modified to provide the sole protest forum, with appeals to a judicial body, such as the COFC or the Federal Circuit. The Comptroller General’s protest
jurisdiction might require amendment to address
certain issues (e.g., recommendations versus binding decisions) that could implicate separation of
powers concerns, allow GAO (or some other forum) to address certain issues that the GAO currently does not handle, and provide broader discovery opportunities for protesters. At the very
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least, however, GAO should consider whether
small business interests could be met by such an
arrangement.
Unnecessary Confusion and Litigation: Ambiguous language in the ADRA’s sunset provision
may prompt protracted, unnecessary, and expensive litigation leading to confusion and uncertainty
in the procurement marketplace. For example,
after the FCIA and prior to the ADRA, federal
Appellate Courts split on the meaning of the word
“exclusive” (in relation to the COFC’s preaward
protest jurisdiction) and, accordingly, on the issue of whether District Courts could resolve protest matters filed before an agency awarded a contract. Many predict that confusion will again arise
if Congress permits a sunset of statutory (ADRAgranted) District Court bid protest jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the statutory sunset, District
Courts might continue to exercise protest jurisdiction pursuant to Scanwell (citing the APA) because the ADRA failed to expressly eliminate that
jurisdiction developed by 30 years of judicial precedent.
The Justice Department, of course, expects
that if Congress allows the sunset, Scanwell jurisdiction will end. There is some support in the
legislative history of the ADRA, however, for the
argument that APA-based Scanwell jurisdiction
will survive the ADRA’s sunset provisions. The
Senate’s original version of the text eliminated
Scanwell jurisdiction, but the House refused to
pass this version. A compromise was struck, leaving the statute silent as to Scanwell jurisdiction.
(142 CONG. REC., S6, 155–57 (daily ed. June 12,
1996).) The statute’s silence may support a legitimate argument that Scanwell jurisdiction—exercised pursuant to the APA—could continue irrespective of the sunset of the specific grant of
jurisdiction in the ADRA.
Forum Shopping, Precedent Fragmentation:
Critics assert that maintaining concurrent jurisdiction could promote forum shopping and precedent fragmentation. With isolated exceptions,
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these fears appear unfounded based upon experience with concurrent jurisdiction to date. Both
the District Courts and the COFC typically remain cognizant and respectful of the Comptroller
General’s more developed and broader-based precedent in protest matters. As a result, the District Courts and the COFC have generated precedent reasonably consistent with that of the
Comptroller General’s office. As for the isolated
instances of precedent fragmentation, the District
Courts pose no greater threat in this regard than
the COFC’s individual judges, who are not bound
by, and at times disagree with, their colleagues’
decisions. Further, existing venue and procedural
rules ensure that bid protest cases pose forum
shopping problems that are no worse than in other
matters in which the Government waives its sovereign immunity.
Allocating Judicial Resources: While it may
be true that concurrent jurisdiction increases the
burden on an overwhelmed District Court judiciary, relatively speaking (and spread across the
entire federal District court judiciary), that burden is insignificant. Conversely, at the COFC, the
addition of as few as four dozen protests each
year—the rough annual average of District Court
protests during FYs 1997–99—would prove highly
disruptive. At its current staffing levels—including an unusually large group of senior judges—
such an increase could require that each judge
handle two additional injunctive matters each
year. Moreover, the GSBCA’s experience with
protest litigation demonstrated that even small
increases in protest filings come at a price to other
litigants. Resolution of pending matters deemed
less time-sensitive, such as Contract Disputes Act
appeals, will be delayed.
Any increased burden at the COFC, however,
assumes that contractors perceive the COFC as a
perfect substitute for District Courts and that all
contractors that previously pursued District Court
protest remedies would litigate willingly in the
COFC. As discussed below, such a conclusion is
misguided. Some contractors, particularly small
businesses, will decline to pursue remedies before the COFC, but the precise number of contractors who will be frustrated in this manner is
unknown. But quantifying, extrapolating, and predicting small businesses’ willingness to file bid protests absent a District Court option was, of course,

GAO’s original statutory assignment. GAO’s efforts clearly have fallen fall short of this congressional mandate.
Limited Investigation Produces A Data
Set of Limited Utility—While GAO’s efforts to
interview the attorneys involved in recent court
protest actions may produce some interesting
anecdotal information, this methodology is of limited empirical value for a number of reasons.
Recent Increase in Filing of Judicial Protests:
After the Scanwell case was decided, the numbers of bid protest suits filed in the District Courts
were insignificant. After the ADRA, however, both
the District Courts and the COFC experienced a
sharp increase in the volume of protest litigation.
The COFC averaged only about one dozen protests per year in the decade preceding the ADRA.
Since the ADRA, the COFC received more than
three dozen protests in FY 1997, more than 40
protests in FY 1998, and about 60 protests in FY
1999. District Courts seem to have been handling
a similar volume of protest cases—i.e., almost 30
in FY 1997, 40 in FY 1998, and almost 60 in FY
1999.
According to Department of Justice statistics
on bid protests filed since the ADRA, only a small
number of contractors have filed more than one
protest. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude
that, if there is further increase in protest activity, it will come from contractors that have not
filed a protest during the last three years. This
almost unlimited pool of potential protestors fails
to appear on GAO’s radar screen at all, and their
views therefore are not considered in GAO’s study.
Given GAO’s methodology, it will be nearly impossible to draw conclusions on how the sunset of
District Court bid protest jurisdiction will affect
protest activity.
Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: A preliminary
questionnaire prepared by GAO for District Court
protestors and their counsel specifically asked
whether the loss of District Court jurisdiction
would affect counsels’ ability to bring future bid
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protest cases. While the questionnaire may have
asked some valuable questions, the data generated is skewed by a disproportionate share of responses from private attorneys practicing before
the COFC and/or the three District Courts located
in the Washington, DC-area. Because of the availability of the COFC and GAO, however, these firms
and the interests of their clients (whether large
or small) would be least affected if District Court
protest jurisdiction ceases.
For the same reason, the FBA’s conclusion that
the COFC offers a viable substitute for District Court
protest jurisdiction also should be taken with a grain
of salt. This position assumes (without empirical
support) that, in the absence of District Court protest jurisdiction, all matters that contractors would
have pursued in District Courts will be filed in the
COFC. If this theory holds water—if for example,
litigants have no preference whatsoever for courts
of general jurisdiction—it likely is true primarily
with regard to contractors already represented by
DC-based attorneys because the costs associated
with DC-based litigation are neutral.
Similarly, GAO’s initiative to discuss with numerous Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) the individual protest actions in which they defended the
Government seems irrelevant. By analogy, would
interviewing prosecutors give unique insight into
predicting criminal behavior? Disappointed
offerors—and not the Government—choose the
protest forum. Moreover, only an infinitesimal percentage of AUSAs have sufficient familiarity with
the COFC to be able to offer comparative experience. For a typical AUSA, a disappointed offeror
suit represents a time-sensitive (short-fuse) matter in a field with which he or she likely is unfamiliar. It thus would be shocking if AUSAs did not
favor elimination of concurrent jurisdiction. Similarly, the Justice Department, which is on record
favoring an exclusive judicial protest remedy in the
COFC, now must defend protest actions in both
judicial fora. From DOJ’s standpoint, it is easier to
manage litigation in a single forum, therefore, its
attorneys see no utility in maintaining District
Court jurisdiction over protest matters.
Of equally questionable value are the comments
GAO is gathering on its draft report from various
agencies. With the exception of the Small Business Administration, which should be upset at
GAO’s failure to properly address the effect on
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small businesses of the sunset of District Court
bid protest jurisdiction, Executive Branch agencies
likely will present a united front against continuing District Court bid protest jurisdiction. Prior to
the ADRA, DOD and DOJ advocated elimination of
Scanwell jurisdiction; their post-ADRA positions
on this issue are unlikely to change. Moreover, individual agencies and buying commands generally
perceive protests as an interference with their
mission, a drain on their resources, and a painful
nuisance imposed upon their personnel.
This view was shared by former Office of Federal Procurement Policy Administrator Steve
Kelman, the official most credited for procurement reform. During his tenure at OFPP, Professor Kelman routinely criticized the current protest regime, stating that it (1) was time-consuming
and expensive, (2) exposed agencies to huge vendor lawyer bills, (3) compromised civil servants’
careers, (4) caused public servants to fear deposition by high-priced legal talent, (5) rendered agencies excessively risk-averse and unduly focused
upon documentating their decisions, and (6) decreased goodwill and a spirit of partnership between the Government and its contractors.
These criticisms arguably are the very reasons Congress directed GAO to undertake the
study. That it now appears that the study has
failed to address these and other issues—including the paramount issue of how the elimination of
Scanwell jurisdiction would affect small businesses—is a disappointment; GAO has squandered
an opportunity to add to the body of bid protest
knowledge and to educate Congress on some vital
details concerning award-related Government contract litigation.
Squandered Opportunity: GAO’s cavalier attitude with regard to obtaining a broad cross-section of small business views is startling. The Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS) reports
that during FY 1998, small businesses captured
5.75 million contracts worth more than $42.5 billion. This amount accounts for more than 23% of
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the total dollars awarded (excluding, among other
things, micro-purchases and foreign military
sales). Even more significantly, during the same
year, the Government contracted with 7,678 new
women-owned or small disadvantaged businesses.
Although not reported by the FPDS, the total number of new small businesses doing business with
the Government must be far greater.
Moreover, GAO has access to the raw data
necessary to accumulate statistics on the number
of small businesses pursuing protests in the District Courts and the COFC. A preliminary GAO
questionnaire for counsel filing protests at these
courts posed questions to assess each contractor’s
small business size status. While these questions
may help identify the number of small businesses
pursuing protests recently, it does nothing to assess future protest practice. To get at this issue,
GAO could have polled small businesses or small
business industry leaders on their bid protest forum preferences. This inquiry need not have entailed a Herculean effort. In fact, through the
SBA’s PRO-Net Internet website, http://pronet.sba.gov/, the Government has ready access
to more than 170,000 small, small disadvantaged,
8(a), and women-owned businesses interested in
or currently doing business with the Federal Government. GAO need only have asked, and small
businesses certainly would have provided their
forum preferences.
Clothing Small Business Interests With
The Emperor’s New Apparel—Given the statutory mandate, it is difficult to see how GAO could
conclude that the elimination of District Court
jurisdiction would not adversely affect the ability
of small businesses to challenge violations of federal procurement law. Nevertheless, early indicators are that GAO will not opine whether District Court bid protest jurisdiction is necessary
or desirable from any perspective. In any event,
GAO’s data appears heavily influenced by input
from those least sympathetic to the concerns of
small businesses, particularly the increased
costs—both monetary and otherwise—of litigating in Washington, DC.
Convenience and Comfort Level: The longstanding argument for maintaining bid protest
jurisdiction in the District Courts is that the broadbased District Court system increases disappointed bidders’ access to decisionmakers. Dis-

trict Courts provide protesters with a convenient
judicial forum in which to challenge perceived improprieties during individual procurements—a
function consistent with the private AG’s role in
maintaining the public’s trust in the integrity of
the procurement system. In the past, industry advocates stressed the importance of local fora for
protesters in general and small businesses in particular. Small business lobbyists have argued that
the financial burdens associated with travel to
Washington, DC are significant for large businesses, and almost impossible for small businesses. See 38 GC ¶ 392.
Bid protest cases are one of the rare instances
in which the public contracts bar confronts fastpaced litigation, including temporary restraining
orders and preliminary injunctions. To many small
businesses, travel is an unnecessary obstacle that
can affect the outcome of cases. Indeed, even the
FBA working group (whose members are Washington, DC-based) concluded that it is “unquestionably” more convenient for contractors far from
DC “to have access to their own district courts.”
Yet at times, the organized bar exhibits a tin ear
on this issue. A disproportionate percentage of
the public contracts bar is based in the Washington, DC area, which offers proximity to Congress,
the COFC, GAO, agency boards of contract appeals (BCAs), relevant policy-makers, and regulatory experts. Moreover, experienced Government contract practitioners in CDA matters (e.g.,
contract performance disputes, as opposed to
preaward and postaward contests relating to the
award of such contracts) have grown accustomed
to well-traveled, accommodating adjudicators.
Judges of the COFC (and its predecessor courts)
and administrative judges of the BCAs routinely
travel and hold hearings in CDA disputes at the
parties’ convenience. Judges even bifurcate trials, hearing evidence in multiple cities, if justified by witnesses’ geographical dispersion.
This level of customer service, unfortunately,
is out the question in disappointed offeror litigaThis material from The Government Contractor
has been reproduced with the permission of the
publisher, Federal Publications—A West Group
Co. (901 15th St., N.W., Suite 1010, Washington,
D.C. 20005, phone 202-337-7000). Further use without permission of the publisher is prohibited.
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tion. Although the COFC has the statutory authority to travel to hold protest hearings, in practice the Court rarely does so. Nor is the COFC’s
bench capable of traveling to handle all injunctive
relief actions (a problem that would become more
acute if the COFC absorbed District Courts’ protest dockets).
Moreover, it seems unlikely that GAO recognizes any other potential chilling effects associated with eliminating District Court jurisdiction.
Exclusive COFC protest jurisdiction sends a notso-subtle message to small business that protests
are a game played only inside the beltway. It is a
far cry from the logic of Scanwell to suggest that
small businesses are welcomed, in the role as private AGs, to assist the Government with procurement oversight, but they must travel to Washington, DC to do so. Many small businesses pride
themselves on their independence and view any
proceeding in Washington with great skepticism.
Accordingly, lacking the opportunity to seek relief in their local federal District Court, at least
some small businesses will conclude that protests
just are not worth the effort.
Concerns About Money And Quality of Representation: In protest matters, the two most significant expenses—travel and attorneys’ fees—are
inter-related. Nevertheless, despite the opportunity to interview counsel, GAO made no attempt
to quantify either the increased expenses associated with out-of-town litigation (such as witness
travel and lodging) or the disparities in billing rates
between the attorneys located in the Washington, DC metropolitan area and in other areas of
the country. (On this latter issue, the FBA suggests that these increased costs could be ameliorated by liberalizing the fee recovery provisions
of the Equal Access to Justice Act. While this suggestion might appeal to Rube Goldberg and his
acolytes, it fails to address costs associated with
contractor personnel travel and, more importantly, merely masks the larger issue.)
It lies somewhere between arrogant and naive
to conclude that the potential for increased travel
costs or attorneys’ fees associated with litigation
exclusively in Washington, DC constitutes an acceptable risk of doing business with the Government. While such a risk may be borne willingly by
large defense contractors, no procurement policy
supports it, and such a risk should not be part of
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doing business with the Government.
GAO cannot in good faith suggest that contractors’ (particularly small businesses’) decisions
to litigate in the COFC are completely unrelated
to the cost of that litigation—they are. While a
small business’s inclination to sue is not perfectly
elastic (small increases in litigation costs do not
necessarily trigger large changes the volume of
litigation), anticipated costs constitute a key ingredient in a contractor’s litigation decisions.
These decisions include whether to litigate in the
first place and also whether and, if so, for how
much to settle. GAO’s data cannot dispel the obviously inverse relationship between increased litigation costs and small businesses’ willingness to
litigate. (If GAO could do so, it would warrant the
immediate repeal of the EAJA.)
Even if GAO had attempted to quantify the
increased costs associated with travel and attorneys’ fees, the issue of “cost” goes beyond these
monetary concerns to the substantive issue of
quality of representation. Many contractors are
more comfortable using familiar in-house or local
counsel in protest matters. Working with DCbased counsel for the first time increases the costs
of legal representation in that counsel must quickly
become familiar with the contractor’s business
practices and personnel, as well as with the disputed procurement. In addition to the added expense, the time constraints inherent in disappointed offeror litigation exacerbate the
difficulties associated with distant, unfamiliar
counsel. (Conversely, the DC-area bar’s efficiency
in litigating these matters, derived from their legal expertise and practical experience, may ameliorate the effects of their higher rates. However,
neither GAO nor the bar possesses empirical data
to support such a claim.)
What’s At Stake?—Given the trend towards
reduced oversight of the procurement process, the
importance of maintaining convenient, efficient,
and economical protest fora is obvious. Viewed as
a vehicle for ensuring compliance with the
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Government’s procurement laws, regulations, and
policies, therefore, the protest regime is a bargain. Opponents of protests have neither suggested, nor attempted to demonstrate, a more
cost-effective, less intrusive oversight regime. An
increased Inspector General presence, or other
labor-intensive surveillance mechanisms, would
please no one.
In a government of the people, where procurement professionals annually spend $200 billion in
taxpayer funds, public trust is key. The age-old
query, “who watches the watchmen?” remains vital today. The Government’s contractors, and those
that seek the Government’s procurement dollars—
including numerous small businesses—have long
played a vital role in monitoring the procurement
process. But after a decade of acquisition reform
in a remarkably strong economy, these same contractors appear complacent, if not passive, and
consistently nonchalant regarding any responsibility related to policing the procurement system.
Meanwhile, acquisition reforms continue to eliminate or dilute existing oversight mechanisms. If
these trends continue, the procurement system
will suffer. If contractors cannot easily serve their
own interests, and in doing so, ensure the procurement system’s integrity on a solicitation-bysolicitation basis, alternative oversight mechanisms must be considered.
The costs associated with District Court protest jurisdiction are so minute that they defy quantification. The potential benefits—validating the
role of protestors as private AGs and invigorating the contracting community to fulfil its oversight role—are enormous. It’s time for some common sense. Let’s hope GAO proves me wrong,
recognizes what’s at stake, and recommends continued District Court jurisdiction over preaward
and postaward bid protests.
✦
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